The Contingency Argument Does Not Point To A God.
For completeness, here's the Contingency Argument (CA):
P1. Things are either contingent or non-contingent.
P2. If everything were contingent, there'd be an infinite regress of contingency.
P3. An infinite regress is impossible.
C. By Modus Tollens, there is at least one non-contingent thing.
In what follows, I'll argue the non-contingent thing(s) the contingency argument points to isn't necessarily a God.
The first observation is that the Contingency Argument does **not** conclude the existence of a single non-contingent being. Rather, it concludes **at least 1 and potentially many** non-contingent things exist. But if the set of non-contingent things is plural, it opens the door to spacetime, quarks, energy, and more to be the fundamental non-contingent elements of reality.
At this point, many theists like to invoke the doctrine of **divine simplicity** and argue that the non-contingent thing must be "simple" and "without parts", ruling out the possibility of multiple non-contingent beings. However, this approach has many problems.
1. **Divine simplicity (DS) is logically problematic.**
Under DS, God doesn't have attributes the way other beings do; rather, he is identically equal to each of his attributes (i.e. God = power, God = grace, God = justice, etc...). Why? If God merely exemplifies attribute X, it must be the case that God is logically contingent on the existence of attribute X. If God were merely an example of 'goodness', there must already be a conception of 'goodness' that is distinct from God for him to instantiate (contradicting God's non-contingency)
Disciples of DS hold that God cannot exemplify an existing property; rather, he includes them ontologically in his being. And since God must be simple and without parts, it follows that God is identically equal to each of the attributes he ontologically incorporates.
A natural logical consequence of the observation above is that power = grace = justice = etc... (where '=' means identically equal to), which is incoherent. The subtle violation of non-contradiction in this doctrine is what makes the concept of God so infinitely flexible since once a contradiction is assumed, inferences of every sort follow.
2. **DS implies the universe is necessary and therefore could be a non-contingent thing on its own.**
To see this, we first note DS insists that God is a pure act (since if God were some combination of "actual" and "potential", he would be made of parts and hence contingent). Since God is necessary and has no unrealized potential, anything God does, he necessarily does.
Since 1) God created the universe, 2) God's existence is necessary, and 3) God's act of creating the universe is necessary (because pure act), it follows that the universe's existence is necessary. However, if that's the case, the universe is non-contingent and the contingency analysis could simply stop there.
3. **The presumably singular non-contingent thing need not necessarily create the universe**.
The contingency relationship isn't necessarily causal.
For example, although quarks and energy are contingent on the existence of spacetime (since the former would not exist without the latter), it would be false to assert that spacetime **created** energy or quarks. As far as our understanding of physics goes, the relationship between spacetime and quarks isn't a causal one, very much unlike the presumed relationship between God and his universe.
4. **The non-contingent thing could simply be an abstract object.**
One characterization of a non-contingent thing is something that has its essence and existence perfectly aligned. A trivial example of such a thing is the integers. The essence of the number 2 and the existence of 2 are the same because both are precisely what we defined 2 to be. Per the contingency argument, we should expect 2 to be the progenitor of the universe but alas that is not so.
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With divine simplicity out of the way, we now see that spacetime, energy, or quarks (which are fundamental according to our current understanding of physics) are perfectly capable of being the candidate for the non-contingent thing that the argument from contingency hints at.