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r/thedavidpakmanshow • … • u/Veda_OuO

In Defense of the Two-Party System: An Argument From Game Theory/Incentive Structure

Like many members of this sub, for the longest time I thought it plainly true that the US would benefit heavily from its adoption of a multiparty system. I'm making this post because I've changed my mind.

I've just finished reading "Responsible Parties" co-authored by Ian Shapiro, a sterling professor of political science at Yale (maybe you've seen his youtube lectures), and I thought it would be interesting to discuss the arguments presented in the book with fellow progressives. I'm curious if you find them to be as pursuasive as I do.

# The Main Argument:

If we think about the politcal landscape as an ecosystem, the book argues that the existence of two large parties creates a unique competitive environment which serves, like no other system could, to deliver on the key democratic promise: to produce policies which serve the long-term interests of most voters.

The forces at play which produce these healthy political outcomes are a result of implicit incentive structures which emerge naturally (and only) from two-party competition. These incentives are many, but I'll discuss some of the major players here:

* Winner-take-all Competition:

This is perhaps the central motivating force behind the theory. If you do not secure the vote of an individual in a two-party system, then your *direct* and *only* antagonist will. This leads to a political environment where the consequences of your successes *AND* failures are maximized; that vote you lost will work directly against you, and with maximal force.

In a multiparty system, in some sense, you are mathematically "off the hook"; the impact of the voter's disaffection is not a zero-sum calculation (the voter could potentially go to a future coalition partner or party which does not directly compete with your policy goals). This can mean that the *personal/idealogical* consequences of your political failure are diminished.

* Last-Best-Offer:

The book gives some really interesting examples of similar competitive incentives, like those found in "last-best-offer" negotiations, where each of the two parties engaged in a negotiation has *exactly* *one* opportunity to make an offer to a neutral arbitrator. That neutral arbitrator is *forced* to pick from one of the two original offers; there can be *no compromise*.

This is how the book characterizes the psychology of the participants in such negotiations:

>The smart strategy is to take the most robust position that you can for your supporters, but do do it in a way that the arbitrator will find more plausible than the position of your adversary -- who you know is trying to do the same thing you are.

The beauty of this psychology and incentive structure, which arises from the need to account for the reasonable desires of your opponent, is that:

>Not surprisingly, this kind of arbitration generally causes both sides' offers to converge.

If there is a tolerable middle-ground solution, it is generally found.

A two party system reflects this dynamic because each party must craft a policy agenda which appeals to the most voters (moderate platforms, with their direct opponent's voters in mind) or risk losing everything to their opponent's policy agenda.

Basically, last-best-offer aims to frontload each party's actual, minimally-self-interested platform. There are no used car salesman pricing their cars at 15k, when they are actually happy to sell for 7k.

* Self-Regulation/Policing

The loser of the election in a two-party system continues to play a vital role in political process, despite not being in power: they are the watchdogs who will hold the governing party accountable to the voting public. It is solely their duty - again, a maximal incentive drives the behavior.

The book terms the losers: the "party in waiting". Because one party has primary control over governance, it is *no mystery* who should be blamed when the ship strays from its intended course. The party in waiting must feverishly investigate corruption, point out failed promises, expose wasteful spending, and elucidate harmful consequences of majority legislation.

In a multiparty system, where power is diluted through coalitions and deadlocked by complex (and often intractable) negotiations, the culprits for political turmoil can be hard to pin down. Was the promise not delivered because of political incompetence or a deadlocked legislature? The answer is often unknowable. There is no such ambiguity in two-party systems: the majority bears the responsibility because they have the legislative power.

* Stability/Predictability/Responsibility

As mentioned above, coalitions are inextricable staples of multiparty politcal environments. Typically, no single party is large enough to force even the main goals of their agenda through the legislative process on their own. They must form alliances with other parties and in the process compromise their own agendas.

This may sound like a healthy process, however, these impromptu coalitions come with some very nasty externalities:

1. The composition of the coalitions is often unknown before the election. This means you don't know exactly who your party will ally with and what that ally's agenda will be. It's not unheard of for moderate parties to ally with radicals if it means they can deliver on a major policy promise for their constituents. 2. When two coalitions come together to negotiate, every other party is left to deal with the consequences. For example, a party made up of farmers and another made up of retailers may come together to slash very narrowly-beneficial regulations, raise price caps, and lower specific taxes - all of which makes fantastic sense to their voters - yet, these highly-specific policies often have many downstream negative effects on society as a whole. In this example, you could imagine a rise in consumer prices, environmental waste, and foodborne illness, all because the only considerations at play were the benefits which would be conferred to the legislative power holders. 3. Small, radical parties parties enjoy special privileges and often have NO incentive to come to a timely/fair compromise. Large parties often rely on alliances with smaller parties to reach a critical voting mass; this allows these small parties to hold large legislative agendas hostage in exchange for favors which disproportionately benefit their small constituencies and harm the average voter.

Similar incentives drive long-term planning in two-party systems. Voters consume policy in the context of a fully fleshed out, pre-determined agendas; hopefully, ones where both the relative costs and benefits of each individual policy can be examined alongside every other policy.

# Conclusion:

The argument basically examines, in isolation, the implicit incentive structures of various democratic political organizations.

The obvious question is then: so if two-party systems come with all of these implicit benefits, why is the US so indisputably dysfunctional?

The book makes a case which applies only to an *idealized* two-party system; it argues that major reforms are necessary for these incentives to wield their true power.

I can discuss the specifics in the comments, but the gist of it is that parties must be "strong" as the book terms it; they must be autonomous and able to actualize their agendas. As an example, this means that the parties themselves should have the power to select and remove their candidates.

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